As to the leisurely marching of two or three miles on Sunday, we have seen how Brooks's march was summarily arrested at Salem Church, and how his attempt to force a passage, cost him alone some fifteen hundred men.

There is a good deal of evidence difficult to deal with in this movement of the Sixth Corps. The report of Gen. Howe, written immediately after the campaign, states facts dispassionately, and is to the point and nothing more. This is as it should be in the report of a general to his superior. It has but one error of consequence, viz., the assumption that the three divisions of Anderson, McLaws, and Early, all under command of Gen. Lee, attacked his line, leaving no force in front of Brooks and Newton. It was Early alone, or Early assisted by a brigade of Anderson, who attacked Howe.

But his testimony a year later, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, cannot be commended as dispassionate, and contains serious errors. Gen. Howe states that the order to advance towards Chancellorsville was received "just after dark, say eight o'clock," whereas it was not sent until nine P.M. from Chancellorsville, and ten P.M. from Falmouth; nor did Sedgwick receive it until eleven P.M. Howe evidently remembered the order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road, as the one to march to Chancellorsville,--when speaking of time of delivery. The deductions Gen. Howe makes from errors like this are necessarily somewhat warped. But let us give all due weight to the testimony of an able soldier. He states that his attack on Marye's heights was made on a mere notice from Sedgwick, that he was about to attack, and desired Howe to assist; that he received on Sunday evening a bare intimation only from Sedgwick, that the left of the corps must be protected, and that he consequently moved his own left round to the river; and later, that Sedgwick sent him word to strengthen his position for defence; but complains that Sedgwick did not properly look after his division. "Not receiving any instruction or assistance from Gen. Sedgwick, I felt that we were left to take care of ourselves. It seemed to me, from the movements or arrangements made during the day, that there was a want of appreciation or a misunderstanding of the position which we held." Sedgwick's entire confidence in Howe's ability to handle his division, upon general instructions of the object to be attained, might account fully for a large part of this apparent vagueness. But Howe does not look at it in this light. His opinion was, that no necessity existed for the Sixth Corps to fall back across the river.

Gen. Howe's testimony is very positive as to the possibility of the Sixth Corps complying with Hooker's order as given. He thinks a night attack could have been made on the Fredericksburg heights, and that they could have been speedily carried, and the corps have been well on the road to Chancellorsville long before daylight. He also is of opinion that Brooks's division could have forced its way beyond Salem Church, with proper support. But we also know how gallant an attempt Brooks made to do this very thing, and how hard he struggled before yielding to failure.

It is in no wise intended to begrudge Gen. Howe his opinion; but he has certainly arrived at some of his conclusions, from premises founded on errors of fact.

The testimony of Col. Johns, which follows Gen. Howe's before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, bears only the weight to which the report of the commander of a brigade is entitled, whose duties allowed him to have but a partial view of the general features of the march. Though his opinion agrees with Gen. Howe's, he, too, mistakes the hour of the urgent order; and it is difficult to see why he was summoned before the Committee, unless as a partisan.

"My object" (continues Hooker) "in ordering Gen. Sedgwick forward at the time named, was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself at Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May." This statement is not only characteristic of Hooker's illogical method, but disingenuous to the degree of mockery. For this position, it will be remembered, was a strongly intrenched line, held by eighty thousand men, well armed and equipped, having in their front less than half their number of Confederates. In view of Hooker's above-quoted opinion about rifle- pits; of the fact that in his testimony he says: "Throughout the Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter;" of the fact that the enemy in his front had been cut in two, and would so remain if he only kept the salient, just seized by Sickles and Pleasonton, at the angle south-west of Fairview, well manned; and of the fact that he had unused reserves greater in number than the entire force of the enemy,--is it not remarkable that, in Hooker's opinion, nothing short of a countermarch of three miles by the Sixth Corps, the capture of formidable and sufficiently manned intrenchments, (the work of the Army of Northern Virginia during an entire half year,) and an advance of nearly twelve miles,--all of which was to be accomplished between eleven and daylight of a day in May,--could operate to "relieve him from the position in which he found himself on the night of the 2d of May"?

"I was of the opinion, that if a portion of the army advanced on Lee's rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee would take the road Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from his depot, would have to retire by way of Gordonsville." Well enough, but was Sedgwick's corps the only one to accomplish this? Where were Reynolds, and Meade, and Howard, forsooth?

There is no particular criticism by Hooker upon Sedgwick's authority to withdraw to the north side of the river, or upon the necessity for his so doing. And we have seen how hard-pressed and overmatched Sedgwick had really been, and that he only withdrew when good military reasons existed, and the latest-received despatch of his superior advised him to do so. But Hooker states that "my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwick retain a position on the south side of the river, in order that I might leave a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of my force re-cross the river, march down to Banks's Ford, and turn the enemy's position in my front by so doing. In this, too, I was thwarted, because the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick to withdraw and cover Banks's Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one who bore the order countermanding the withdrawal."

Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and hold a position at Taylor's, the point where the Fredericksburg heights approach the river, above the town, and terminate. But as these heights were by that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridges there, the proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriously entertained, with two-thirds of Lee's whole army surrounding his one corps, though he did reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carry out his chief's suggestions.

But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson's corps in his front,--some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand,--to move upon his enemy, "attack and destroy him," and himself fall upon Lee's rear, while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks's Ford? And Hooker had all Sunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrange for attempting this simplest of manoeuvres.

It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a gigantic piece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, could lack the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the one indicated. From the stirring words, "Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" of April 12, to the inertia and daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step. And yet Hooker, to judge from his testimony, seems to have fully satisfied himself that he did all that was to be expected of an active and intelligent commander.

The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among many of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "Question.--Can you tell why it was not ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third Corps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick's engagement with the enemy? Answer.--I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to re-cross the river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of the officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. I do not know why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have withdrawn. I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gained certain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weaker than we were."

"Question.--Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army had been ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained a victory there? Answer.--I think we should have taken the offensive when the enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick."

Again Hooker: "During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the right," (i. e., at Chancellorsville,) "from one end of the line to the other, to feel the enemy's strength, and find a way and place to attack him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on him behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed he could destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works. Subsequent campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then ascertained."

Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), had had nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true state of facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of his subordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southern press. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson's corps opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had time enough to erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he excuses himself from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered them four to one. Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he had said that at the time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand men before him? It is a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such capricious and revocatory evidence.

Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we felt the enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entire division made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great force on our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have been done with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what force Lee left behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it is not strange that the purposelessness of the commander should result in half-hearted work by the subordinates.

The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker's and the actual facts, shows palpably who is in the right.

"At nine A.M., May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: 'I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday, A.M., was twenty-two thousand men: I do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I can't use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg.'

"Question.--When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you have referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy?